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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this appeal is by writ of certiorari to the 
court of appeals under Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-2-2(2) & (5) 
(1953, as amended). The dismissal of this tort claim was 
affirmed by the court of appeals. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are: 
1. Whether summary judgment was properly issued by the 
trial court; and 
2. Whether the trial court properly denied the plaintiff's 
motion to amend her complaint. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1953 as amended) 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) 
The text of these three statutes and rules is set out 
verbatim in Appendix "C". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. NATURE AND DISPOSITION OF THE CASE. 
On August 28, 1983, plaintiff Virginia Yearsley spent the 
day drinking with friends at Pine View Reservoir. At 
approximately 10:00 p.m., she and her friends were returning to 
her house in her friends' motor home when they were stopped by 
defendant Officer Jensen for suspicion of driving under the 
influence of alcohol. Verbal sparring followed and Jensen called 
for backups. When the defendant backup officers arrived, they 
arrested plaintiff on a variety of charges. She resisted, 
struggled, but was finally handcuffed and put in a cruiser. 
After she pled guilty to and was convicted of disorderly 
conduct, she filed a notice of claim against the defendants for 
assault, battery and trespass* The defendants filed a motion for 
summary judgment because her notice was filed too late, beyond 
the year deadline. To avoid dismissal, the plaintiff 
unsuccessfully argued that the torts were continuing and she was 
free to file her notice of claim after the year deadline had 
passed. She also moved to amend to allege wrongful arrest and 
malicious prosecution claims. The court held that she missed the 
filing deadline, that she could not state a claim on either 
theory, and entered summary judgment. 
Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of the claims against the 
policemen, but did not appeal the dismissal of the three 
defendant governmental entities. She also appealed the denial of 
her motion to amend. This court transferred the case to the Utah 
Court of Appeals, which issued an Order of Affirmance on 
March 30, 1989. (Appendix "A"). A writ of certiorari was issued 
by this court. 
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2. STATEMENT OF FACTS, 
(1) During the late evening hours of August 28, 1983, 
the defendant police officers were acting in the regular course 
of their duties when a fight broke out at the plaintiff's home 
between the plaintiff and the officers. (Appendix f,Bff, Findings 
of Fact, fl 1). Plaintiff was arrested, handcuffed, placed in a 
police car, and taken to McKay Dee Hospital where she was 
examined for injuries. All this happened before midnight on 
August 28, 1983. (Appendix MB,f, Findings of Fact, ff 1, 2). 
(2) After her hospital exam, the plaintiff was taken 
to the Weber County Sheriff's Department where she was booked at 
1:20 a.m. on August 29, 1983. (Appendix "B", Findings of Fact, 
f 2). 
(3) Plaintiff pled guilty to and was convicted of 
disorderly conduct as a result of the altercation. (Appendix 
"B", Findings of Fact H 6). 
(4) On August 29, 1984, plaintiff filed a notice of 
claim against the defendants alleging trespass and assault. That 
notice of claim was filed one year and one day after the alleged 
trespass and assault. (Appendix "B", Findings of Fact, f 3). 
(5) All the acts that the plaintiff complained of in 
her complaint occurred on August 28, 1983. (Appendix "BM, 
Findings of Fact, f 4). 
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(6) The trial court concluded that plaintiff's claims 
arising from the alleged assault and trespass and other conduct 
on August 28, 1983, were barred by plaintiff's failure to comply 
with one-year notice of claim requirement of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-13 (1953 as amended), and granted defendants' motion for 
summary judgment. (Appendix ,fB", Conclusions of Law, f 1). 
(7) The trial court also denied plaintiff's request 
to amend her complaint to allege wrongful arrest because that 
claim was also barred by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1953 as 
amended), since plaintiff's arrest occurred on August 28, 1983. 
(Appendix "B", Conclusions of Law, H 2). 
(8) The court rejected plaintiff's request to amend to 
allege malicious prosecution since that cause of action was so 
different from the assault claim listed in her notice of claim 
that that notice did not cover the malicious prosecution claim. 
(Appendix "Bff, Conclusions of Law, f 3). 
(9) The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the order and 
judgment of the trial court on the grounds that the plaintiff's 
notice of claim was untimely under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 
(1953 as amended). (Appendix "A"). 
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POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S ASSAULT AND BATTERY AND TRESPASS 
CLAIMS WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE SHE 
FAILED TO FILE A TIMELY NOTICE OF CLAIM. 
A. All Plaintiff's Causes of Action Arose a Year and a Day 
Before She Filed a Notice of Claim. 
This is a simple case of failure to file a timely notice of 
claim pursuant to the Governmental Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-1, et seq. (1953 as amended). To state a claim against a 
governmental entity or its employee, the plaintiff must strictly 
comply with the Governmental Immunity Act. Cornwall v. Larsen, 
571 P.2d 925 (Utah 1977). If the plaintiff does not, the claim 
is barred. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 672 (Utah 1983). This 
court has consistently held that the right to recover damages 
against a governmental entity is statutory, and "can be availed 
of when there has been compliance with the conditions upon which 
the right is conferred." id. at 926 (quoting Hamilton v. Salt 
Lake City, 99 Utah 362, 106 P.2d 1028, 1030 (1940)). "[F]ull 
compliance with [the Actfs] requirements is a condition precedent 
to the right to maintain a suit." Cornwall, 571 P.2d at 926 
(quoting Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1975)). 
Thus, plaintiff has no right to sue a governmental entity where 
she has not fully complied with the Act. 
The Act provides that a notice of claim shall be filed 
"within one year after the claim arises." U.C.A. § 63-30-13 
(1953 as amended). If it is not, the claim is barred. Id. 
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For the same reason her trespass action is also barred 
because it also arose on August 28, 1983/ when the defendant 
officers stepped onto the plaintiff's property• Restatement of 
Torts (Second) § 158. W. Prosser and W. Keaton, Law of Torts, § 
13, p. 83, n.55 (5th Ed. 1984). The appellant apparently 
concedes that this claim is barred because she does not raise it 
on her appeal. 
B. Trespass, Assault and Battery and Wrongful Arrest Are 
Not Continuing Torts. 
To avoid dismissal due to her failure to file a timely 
notice of claim, she alleges that assault and battery, trespass, 
and the wrongful arrest claim she wants to make, are continuing 
torts. She argues that in her instance these torts continued 
into the early morning hours of August 29, 1983, so she can treat 
that day as the day her causes of action arose for purposes of 
the one year deadline for filing her notice of claim. 
Her novel continuing tort theory has no basis in fact or 
law. Her cited authority does not even concern assault or 
battery or unlawful arrest or trespass, but rather involve 
nuisances and breaches of easements. Shors v. Branch, 221 Mont. 
390, 720 P.2d 239 (1986); Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena 
Airport, 39 Cal. 3d 862, 218 Cal. Rptr. 293, 705 P.2d 866 (1985), 
cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1017 (1986). According to plaintiff's 
authority, "[cjontinuing torts [are] those torts in which the 
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limitations that would apply if the claim were against a private 
person begins to run." U.C.A. §§ 63-30-11, 13 (1953, as 
amended)• Thus, even if the torts were continuing, a claim for 
them arose when the torts began, not later as they continued. 
U.C.A. § 63-30-11 (1953 as amended). She was required to file a 
notice within a year of when they arose, but she did not. U.C.A. 
S 63-30-13 (1953 as amended). Accordingly, the trial court and 
the court of appeals were correct when they held that the 
plaintiff's assault and battery, trespass and arrest claims were 
barred because the plaintiff failed to file a timely notice of 
claim. 
POINT II 
UNDER U.R.C.P., RULE 15(A), THE TRIAL COURT 
PROPERLY DENIED THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
AMEND TO ALLEGE UNLAWFUL ARREST AND MALICIOUS 
PROSECUTION CLAIMS. 
Plaintiff correctly points out that generally leave to amend 
is liberally allowed in the interest of justice. Chadwick v. 
Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 1988). She charges that the 
trial court abused its discretion by refusing her leave to amend 
to allege malicious prosecution and wrongful arrest. Plaintiff, 
however, fails to recognize that the court was not deciding 
whether a new recognizable claim ought to be tried in light of 
time restraints or fairness to the opposition. That was not the 
kind of issue before the court. Rather, it properly tested the 
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r e :: o g i :i i z a b J e 1: e c a i i s e s I: I c= • c o u ] d i l c t s t a t e a :: 1 a i rri, f o r 
malicious prosecution or wrongful arrest, and denied her moti on 
because the amendments would be i u L n e . 
Courts commonly reluse requ^st^ f^ »mprw ^^^r* *b*> proposed 
amendment fai Is to all ege facts whj ch won ] d suppor t a va 1 i d 
: 1 ii at :ii ] ii te :: r /I lei: e tl le pa i: I::;; iiioic i i l g 1: :: amei id 1 las 
shown that the proposed amendment has substai iti al mer i t f 
Verhein v. South Bend Lathe, Inc , 598 F 2d 1 061 ,„, 1 063 ( 71h 
] 979 ) (I : c si: < i i i c i • i ) Fomari v . Da v is , 371 I J S 1 78 9 I E 1 
222, 8 3 S.Ct 22 7 (1 9 62) 1 Courts are encouraged to determine 
whether proposed amendments st: ate a claim. Otherwise, the • 
tiiiuMidment wu'ij Id ilu,' a 1 lowed, JIK.II I lie del endant. would be torced to 
file «:i Rule 12(b)(6) motion en the basis that the amended 
complaint failed to state a t 1 a n i Ihtere i,? m net-'* I I u I In :. 
JAs the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are fashioned after 
tl ie federal rules, Utah courts may properly rely on federal i: u ] es 
authorities. Pate v. Marathon Steel Corp., 692 P.2d 765 n. 1 
(Utah 1984); Heritage Bank & Trust v. Landon, 770 P 2d ] 009 , ] 01 0 
i , 2 (I It ah App 1989) . 
In each of the following cases the appellate court affirmed 
tl ie trial court's denial of a motion to amend where it would be 
futile to permit the amendment because the proposed cause of 
action failed to state a claim. Marks v. Centran Corp., 747 F.2d 
1536 (6th Cir. 1984) cert, denied 471 U.S. 1125; Emory v. Texas 
State Board of Medical Examiners, 748 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1984); 
Martin v. Associated Truck Lines, 801 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1986); 
Federal Insurance Company v. Gates Lear Jet Corp., 823 F.2d 383 
(10th Cir. 1987); California Architectural Building Products v. 
Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1987). 
duplicitous and wasteful procedure. Consequently, courts, upon 
motion, simply review the amendment under Rule 12(b)(6) at the 
Rule 15(a) stage. This practice is also consistent with Rule 1 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that requires the Rules be 
interpreted and applied "to secure the just, speedy and 
inexpensive determination of every action." U.R.C.P. Rule 1(a). 
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 9 L.Ed. 2d, 222, 83 S.Ct. 227 
(1962) . 
Here the trial court followed the admonition of Rule 1 and 
the practice of the cited courts when it tested plaintiff's 
proposed amended complaint against the standards of U.R.C.P. Rule 
12(b)(6). See Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668 
(Utah 1989). The court determined that any complaint by the 
plaintiff for unlawful arrest or malicious prosecution could not 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and 
consequently properly denied the plaintiff's Rule 15(a) motion. 
A. Plaintiff Could Not State a Claim for Wrongful Arrest. 
Two reasons support the court's denial of the plaintiff's 
motion to amend to allege a wrongful arrest: Failure to file a 
timely notice of claim, and failure to show lack of probable 
-12-
caube iui * ' because she n.: ctnu ueen 
convicted +*<* charges ^ri^i;^ i. wi;. arrest 2. 
r
,f ^ou:" • n *. ^  .* ' : •. -:di si^Jte- : t.r's tht 
1984 notice ^^,: ,
 t Ahiiit, , ^^ *o ^ ^ 19"") i 
as amended) It i s undisputed that before mi dnight on the 2H! Ii 
t l le ]:: J a, ii i i t i f f i ras 1 lai l ::i ::i i ff e ::i am: I :::! t a k e i i il  :i i t c u s I o d y iiinl 11 I mi! "i I  
i i i a po l i c e ca r i \ t t l l a t poi n t she was a r r e s t e d . ( Sen 111 I of 
t h e Fi n d i n g s of F a c t
 # Appendi x B ) To1man v , K -Mar t E n t e r p x i s e s 
of U ta t i , 569 I 2 1 II 1 2 ; ( I I I 1 3 9 ; ; ) ' 
Utah law 1 lolds that the tort of false arrest arises the 
instant there i s '"wrongf i I] i niposi ti on o£ :: ::>i itt r • :: • J ovei [ :)ne ' ! J || 
freedom of movement, To 3 ma n, 569 P . 2d a t ] ] 28 Ii l To 1 man 
p 1 a i n t i f f w a s a r r e s t e d £ o i: shop 1 i f t i n g H e s u e d f o r f a 1 s e 
when I: le was takei I ii itc custody, but instead whei i he was acquitted 
of the charges. The court disagreed: 
'^This court may affirm .;.*.: u i c u uourt's decisioi i on ai ry 
proper ground despite the trial court fs having assigned another 
reason for its decision, Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates . 
752 ^ Id 8.92
 r 895 (1 1 t: .al ] 9 88) . 
• person is under arrest m I i = • i I 1 ie i s ::Ieprived of his 1 1berty 
by an officer who intends to arrest him. State v. Solis, 8 Wash. 
App. 484, 685 P.2d 672 (1984). According to the Restatement of 
Torts (Second) § 1 3 2, "[a]n arrest is the taking of another into 
custody for the actual purported purpose of bringing the other 
before a court, or of otherwi se securing the admi nistration of 
the law. , 
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[the] general rule is that a statute limiting the time 
in which an action may be brought begins to run when 
cause of action arises. In this instance, that was the 
time of the claimed false imprisonment, which occurred 
as it is recited above on November 16, 1974." 
560 P.2d at 1128. 
Thus, under Tolman, plaintiff's cause of action for false 
arrest arose on August 28, 1983 she was handcuffed; it was then 
that she was denied her freedom of movement. State v. Solis, 
supra. As recited above, she failed to file her notice of claim 
until August 29, 1984, one day after the end of the one-year 
limitation period. Since her false arrest claim failed as a 
matter of law, she was properly denied leave to amend under Rule 
15(a). 
Her false arrest action also failed because she could not 
meet the element of the claim that the arrest be without probable 
cause. Rabalais v. Blanche, 524 So. 2d 772 (La. App. 3d Cir. 
1988). If the plaintiff claiming false arrest was convicted of 
one of the offenses for which she was arrested, then as a matter 
of law there was probable cause to affect the arrest. Ici. In 
Rabalais v. Blanche, the plaintiff brought an action against its 
employer for malicious prosecution and false arrest. The 
plaintiff had pled guilty to misdemeanor theft. The court 
granted summary judgment on the false arrest claim holding that 
"clearly, there was probable cause to detain and question 
-14-
reliant * J ' LIICIL ci n 
-i- i s-puted T • p x a n / if ;*lec : . . and 
1 1 III 
;'a^ * . i 1^1 *.«: e i e i u r e , sue c u u i c r . p e 
t h a t V* was a r r e s t e d w i t h o u t p r o b a b l e c a u s e <• - -lairr f a i l s . 
rope r 1 j 
recover under the facts a11eged."" Lowe v. Sorenson Research _ Co
 t 
7 7 9 P .2d 668 , 668 (I It a h 1 989) 
B. Plaintiff could Not State a Lia±m :o. Malicious 
Prosecution. 
• malicious prosecution hd , four elements: , , / n * 
criir* a. p r o c e e d i n g i n s t i t u t e d or c o n t i n u o d b y t h e d e f e n d a n t 
a g a i *:' t trie i t ( m n I i i in i m i 11 i i i n i i i i m 111 111 n< < lt i i 1111 
nf , accuse • | a b s e n c e ol p r o b a b l e c a u s e J or fJif« pro t -eeu jng 
fane * :ru. -
 ( oi <i p r i m a r y p u r p o s e o t h e r than that, of 
I HIH] i in l in ! i n , Ann i d Mil t ua i l i ibm ance Lorrtpai iy 
v. s c h e t t l e i 7 68 P. 2d 950, 9ci9 i lit ah App I ( c i t i n g Lu 1 1 i o u x 
v . P r o g r e s s i v e I n s u r a n c e Company, 745 P . 2d 838 843 (Utah App. 
i KIJ "1 1 I i: o s s e r ai id W. Kea toi l Law of I ' o r t s , % I! I'"! ( " i 
r-a . 1984 )
 f '""' r he f a i ] u r e t o e s t a b l i s h any one of t h e f our 
e l e m e n t s i s f a t a l t o t h e c a u s e of a c t i o i i.1"1 I d. 
i 11 V1 p i e a t- :> one of t h e c h a r g e s b r o u g h t a g a i n s t a 
p l a i n t i t f i n a mal i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i on c a s e p r e v e n t s t h e p l a i n t i f f 
from 'i i Ig I:I :ta I: t.1 ite j : i: ::>ceeci ii i Ig Ill::e • i : in :i i l a t = :::! :li i i f a • ::)i: :: f ill: 1 l e 
accused. Killian v. Fuller, 162 Mich. App. 210, 412 N.W.2d 698 
(1987); Heilaeist v. Chasser, 98 Wis. 2d 97, 295 N.W.2d 26 (Wis. 
App. 1980); Rabalais v. Blanche, 524 So. 2d 772 (La. App. 3d 
Cir. 1988). In each of these cases, the accused pled guilty or 
was convicted of one of the charges for which she was prosecuted. 
Each court held that the plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim 
failed as a matter of law. 
The same rule and result apply here. It is undisputed that 
the plaintiff pled guilty to and was convicted of disorderly 
conduct arising out of the incident on August 28, 1983. 
Consequently her claim was barred. The court had no choice but 
to deny her Rule 15(a) motion to amend her complaint to allege 
malicious prosecution. 
In addition, the plaintiff's failed to file a notice of 
claim of her malicious prosecution claim. Her notice of claim 
against the policemen and their cities was for injuries occurring 
when the defendants "physically beat the claimant in the course 
of an arrest of a third party." It mentions nothing about a 
claim for malicious prosecution. Therefore, the notice violated 
U.C.A. § 63-30-11 that requires a notice of claim to "set forth 
. . . the nature of the claim asserted." U.C.A. 63-30-11 (1953 
as amended). Plaintiff's notice mentions nothing about malicious 
prosecution, but only speaks of a beating. Thus, even if she 
could have stated a claim for malicious prosecution, her claim is 
-16-
nevertheless barred for failure to file a notice of claim 
pursuant to U.C.A. 63-30-11 (1953/ as amended). Cornwall v. 
Larsen, supra. The court's refusal to allow her to amend to 
state what would have been a futile malicious prosecution claim 
was therefore proper under U.R.C.P. Rule 15(a). Foman v. Davis, 
supra. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the court should affirm the 
Utah Court of Appeals decision. 
DATED this 6th day of December, 1989. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By / 4 ^ ^ ^ ' ^ ^ ^ 
Andrew M. Morse 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Washington Terrace City and 
Officer Jensen 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
AMM443 
Sanders 
tneys for Respondants South 
Ogden City and Officer 
Wallerstein 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
t K. "Hilcler 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Riverdale City, Officer Steve 
Smith and Riverdale Police 
Department 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
coOcc 
Virginia Yearsley, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Officer Dean Jensen, Officer 
Steven Wallerstein, and 
Officer Steven Smith, 
Defendants and Respondents* 
Before Judges Jackson, Greenwood, and Newey (Retired Juvenile Judge 
Sitting by Special Assignment) (On Rule 31 Hearing). 
The order and judgment of the trial court is affirmed because 
the notice of claim made against defendants, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-13 (1SS5), was not timely filed* 
Dated this 30th day of March, 1989. 
FOR .TEE COURT: 
N6rman H. J ^ k s o n , Judge 
Newey, Judge d i s s e n t i n g : 
I d i s s e n t because, in my view, the actions upon which 
p l a i n t i f f has sued continued from August 28th into August 29, 1983, 
on the f a l s e imprisonment and malic ious prosecution c la ims. The 
n o t i c e of c la im f i l e d under .-Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1986) should 
be l i b e r a l l y construed to include the i ssues p l a i n t i f f .raised in her 
proposed amended complaint and was, therefore, t i m e l y . r Based upon 
that n o t i c e of c la im, the t r i a l court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n in 
r e j e c t i n g the proposed amended complaint. Consequently, summary 
judgment should not have been granted. 
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 
Case No. 880145-CA 
APPENDIX "B" 
JOY L. SANDERS 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & KARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Officer 
Wallerstein 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City,- Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
ANDREW M. MORSE 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & KARTINEAU 
Attorneys for. Defendant Officer 
Jensen 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
POST: Office Box 45000 
Sal- Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
DALE J. LAMBERT 
ROBERT K. WILDER 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorneys for Defendant Officer 
Smith 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WE3ER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VIRGINIA YEARSLEY, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
Plaintiff, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs . 
OFFICER DEAN JENSEN, OFFICER 
STEVEN WALLERSTEIN, and OFFICER 
STEVEN SMITH, Civil No. 94172 
Defendants. 
This matter having come on for hearing before the Honor able 
represented by John T. Caine, defendant Dean Jensen being 
represented by Andrew M. Morse, defendant Steven Wallerstein 
being represented by Joy L. Sanders, and defendant Steven Smith 
being represented by Dale J. Lambert, the Court having heard 
oral argument, having reviewed the memoranda, exhibits, and 
affidavits, and with good cause appearing therefor, does now 
enter its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That during the late evening hours of August 28, 1983, 
the defendant police officers were acting in the course and 
scope of their duties when an altercation broke out at 
plaintiff's home. Prior to midnight on the 28th, plaintiff was 
arrested, handcuffed, placed in a police vehicle, and taken to 
McKay Dee Hospital where she was examined for possible injuries 
resulting from the altercation with police. 
2. The certified copy of plaintiff's medical records from 
McKay Dee Hospital shows that she was admitted for her 
examination at 11:38 p.m. on August 28, 1983. After the 
examination was completed, she was transferred to the Weber 
County Sheriff's Department where she was booked at 1:20 a.m. 
on August 29, 1983. 
3. On August 29, 1984, Plaintiff filed a notice of claim 
alleging trespass and assault. The notice of claim was filed 
one year and one day after the alleced trespass and assault. 
4. All acts complained of in plaintiff's Complaint 
occurred on August 28, 1983. 
5. Plaintiffs notice of claim did not comply vith Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1965 as amended). 
6. Plaintiff pled guilty to and was convicted of 
disorderly conduct as a result of the altercation on August 23, 
1983. 
From the foregoing Findings cf Fact, the Court hereby 
enters, its: 
CONCLUSIONS CF LAW 
1. That' the plaintiff's claims arising from the alleged 
assault and trespass on August 28, 1983, are barred by 
plaintiff's failure to comply with the notice of claim 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1965 as amended). 
2. That since plaintiff's arrest occurred en August 28, 
1983, an Amended Complaint as requested by plaintiff, to 
include a claim for false or unlawful arrest would also be 
barred by plaintiff's failure to comply with Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-13 (1965 as amended). 
3. Although plaintiff has requested leave to amend to 
include a claim for malicious prosecution, that cause of action 
is quite different from the causes of action defendants were 
put on notice of in plaintiff's notice of claim and in 
plaintiff's Complaint and would, therefore, be improper as well 
as untimely. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, it is hereby 
ORDERZD, ADJUDGED, .AND DECREED that defendants* Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted and that plaintiff's Complaint is 
dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action, without costs. 
DATED -his / L day of November, 1987. 
5Y THE C0U3T: 
Zfevid E.^oth 
lh 
District Court Judge 
A??ROVZD AS TO -OiLM: 
SNOW, CHRISTENSIN & ftARTINZAU 
By llJ^^^r/U/su^ 
\py(V< Sanders 
attorneys fcr Defendant 
Wal le rs te in 
J//S-/& 7 
Date ' 
SNOW, CKR1STZNSIN & MARTINEAU 
By /%*. £&?6A< 
Andrew M. Morse 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Jensen 
/I-6-2-
Date 
SNCW, CKRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
'V A t t o r n e y s f o r Defendant 
Sniixrli 
/ / / 
Jchn-'-.y; C a m e 
N J 
nt~C r"* a* r n e v :o L r i c - i U i i : 
* 2 ^ / . /• 
Date 
\\'\b-%~) 
Dau = 
SOSJLS194 
APPENDIX "C" 
Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-11 (1953, as amended). 
Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — Service — 
Legal Disability 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that 
would apply if the claim were against a private person begins to 
run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a 
governmental entity, or against an employee for an act or 
omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall file a 
written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an 
action, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to 
the claim is characterized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so 
far as they are known. 
(b) The notice of claim shall be signed by the person 
making the claim or that person's agent, attorney, 
parent, or legal guardian, and shall be directed and 
delivered to the responsible governmental entity 
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 
63-30-13. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, 
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, or 
imprisoned at the time the claim arises, the claimant 
may apply to the court to extend the time for service 
of notice of claim. 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental 
entity, the court may extend the time for service 
of notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that 
exceeds the applicable statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an 
extension, the court shall consider whether the delay 
in serving the notice of claim will substantially 
prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its 
defense on the merits. 
Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-13 (1953, as amended). 
Claim against political subdivision or its employee — Time for 
filing notice. 
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance 
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the 
governing body of the political subdivision within one year after 
the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of 
time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not 
the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a 
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is 
served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading 
is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial 
calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it 
is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by 
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and 
leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party 
shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time 
remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days 
after service of the amended pleading, whichever period ma be the 
longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
APPENDIX "D" 
NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST 
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 
Pursuant to Section 63-30-12, Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended, 1980, comes now Virginia Yearsley, and hereby gives 
notice of her intention to pursue an action against the City of 
Washington Terrace, the City of Riverdale, azgs^fr^^JSteM^ 
Ogcen^ for the actions of certain police officers which injured 
her on August 29, 1983. 
WHEREFORE, claimanr requests $100,000 for physical and 
emotional distress, in that the police officers from the City of 
Washington Terrace, the City of Riverdale and the City of South 
Ogden physically beat the claimant in the course of an arrest of 
a third party. 
DATED this ay-of J u n e , 1984, 
r^^^^^L .^ 
lixwuit > ^ t t o r n e y for Clad 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Pursuant to Rule 21(d), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, I 
hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Respondents1 Brief on Appeal was mailed, first class, 
postage prepaid to the following: 
John T. Caine 
Richards, Caine & Allan 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Robert K. Hilder 
Christensen, Jensen & Powell, P.C. 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Joy L. Sanders 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
DATED this day of December, 1989. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorney for Appellants 
Washington Terrace City and 
Officer Jensen 
